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1 Introduction
Akerlof (1970) shows in the pioneering work on adverse selection that when goods
for sale come in di¤erent qualities and when buyers cannot observe the quality of
the good there may be a market failure: only goods of low quality are traded and
the potentially gainful trade of high quality goods remains unrealized. This is the
?lemons principle? and it may occur when the proportion of high quality goods is too
low and their valuation by the sellers (or production cost) su¢ciently higher than that
of low quality goods. The result is based on an analysis of a static Walrasian market
and it depends heavily on restrictions of trading opportunities. It is thus not clear
whether the lemons principle could still hold in a dynamic setting. If one thinks of a
dynamic model where only low quality goods are traded, and where the quality of new
goods or traders is determined randomly, one would expect that the proportion of high
quality goods increases over time, making market failure less likely. This intuition is
formalized e.g. by Janssen and Roy (2004) who consider a dynamic Walrasian market
where new sellers enter the market in each period. The model exhibits cycles, however,
because once the average quality in the market - and thereby the competitive price -
is high enough for the high quality goods to be traded the proportion of these goods
begins to decrease and soon the lemons principle destroys the market for high quality
goods.
We study the Akerlo?an adverse selection problem in a dynamic matching model.
Our purpose is to allow for two important deviations from the Walrasian setting. First,
trading in the market is decentralized as transactions are concluded in private meet-
ings between buyers and sellers. Besides being a plausible feature of many empirically
relevant durable goods markets, e.g. markets for used cars, the decentralized structure
enables an explicit characterization of price formation. Second, as the matching be-
tween buyers and sellers is modeled as an ?urn-ball? process (?rst developed by Butters,
1977, and Hall, 1979), the number of competing buyers a seller confronts is determined
randomly. E¤ectively, the local conditions among buyers varies across di¤erent trad-
ing opportunities. This feature gives rise to the possibility that the feasibility of high
quality trades is not only conditional on the relative share of high quality goods in the
market but also on the competitive situation at the particular contact. As a result,
high quality trades may not be ?doomed? to cyclicality but a steady state may arise
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where high quality goods are traded every period in certain competitive environments.
The urn-ball model also enables the use of auction rather than bargaining as the price
formation method1. This is convenient as bargaining with incomplete information
typically leads to multiplicity of equilibria2.
We analyze the dynamic trading pattern in all possible distributions over high and
low quality goods and study the existence of possible pooling regimes where the goods
of di¤erent qualities are sold at the same price. We start with the standard case where
the trading practice is symmetric in a sense that all seller types trade every period
with equal probability. In the analysis, the valuation of future trading opportunities
or impatience of agents determines the importance of trading frictions. We show that
when trading frictions are signi?cant enough the ?lemons principle? actually inhibits
the high quality trades within a wider range of quality distributions than in Akerlof?s
competitive benchmark. Trading frictions generally improve buyers? ability to earn
positive rents from the low quality trades which creates a negative externality on high
quality sellers? trading opportunities. As a result, the proportion of the high quality
goods has to be relatively high for buyers to be willing to propose a price o¤er that
results in both high and low quality trades. When the discount factor becomes large
enough, i.e. the dynamic trading frictions ease o¤, the quality distributions for which
high quality trades are feasible are the same as in the static Walrasian benchmark.
However, if the quality distribution does not support the pooling steady state
with the equal frequency of trades, the high quality sellers can still expect to trade,
albeit less frequently than the low quality sellers. We consider a partially pooling
equilibrium with asymmetric trading where the sellers of low quality goods trade
whenever at least one buyer approaches them but the sellers of high quality goods
trade only if there is a competitive situation between two or more buyer candidates.
We show that there is a range of quality distributions which in the Akerlo?an world
would make the high quality trades infeasible but in our dynamic setting support the
partially pooling equilibrium. Such an asymmetric trading practice, however, ceases
to exist as a steady state outcome if the discount factor is high enough. As the agents
become more patient, the opportunity cost of sales increases and the low quality sellers
can seize an ever increasing fraction of the rent when in contact with a single buyer
1 As a technical notice, Lu and McAfee (1996) show that in a frictional environement auction but
not bargaining is an ?evolutionary stable? mechanism.
2 See for example Muthoo (1999, ch. 9.8) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, ch. 10.4)
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candidate. This attracts buyers to deviate and o¤er a price that will be accepted also
by the high quality sellers. As a result, the out?ow of high quality goods overruns
their in?ow and the steady state is no longer sustainable. The fact that an increase in
the value of the future trading opportunities limits the sustainability of the partially
pooling equilibrium runs counter to the view that a dynamic trading perspective is a
necessary precondition for a successful resolution of the lemons problem.
There are also quality distributions that support neither of the proposed steady
states. In those cases, the model features pooling trading only in cycles, as in Janssen
and Roy (2004). We show that high quality goods are then traded in non-consecutive
periods. After the active trading period, the proportion of the high quality sellers
immediately drops below the level that would make trading with high quality goods
feasible and the lemons principle kicks in.
In the related literature, Blouin (2003) and Inderst and Müller (2002) provide
the ?rst formalizations of the lemons problem in search and matching framework.
These studies do not, however, consider pooling outcomes but seek to develop price
mechanisms that would induce separation in a sense that high and low quality goods
could be traded at di¤erent prices. Blouin (2003) does not model price formation
explicitly but makes the pairwise matched agents play an exogenously given bimatrix
price game where the agents can choose between two exogenous price levels, a high
and a low price3. He then proves that there exists a continuum of semi-separating
equilibria where low quality sellers quote the low price frequently enough so that
high quality goods can be traded at the high price. Inderst and Müller (2002), in
turn, consider a competitive search model where di¤erent trading environments can
coexist. High quality goods are sold at a more congested high-price submarket while
low quality goods are sold at less congested low-price submarket, so that the sellers
who want to get a high price must accept longer time in circulation. However, as in
Blouin (2003), strategic interactions are absent in the model: Since buyers are taken
to be the long side of the whole market, prices in di¤erent submarkets are determined
by the condition that secures the buyers no more than their reservation utilities.
There are also other studies that develop various separating mechanisms to over-
come the lemons problem. These papers include Janssen and Roy (2002) who show
3 Obviously, this practice helps circumvent the indeterminacy problem related to bilateral bar-
gaining models with asymmetric information.
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in a dynamic Walrasian model without market entry that the price mechanism can
sort the sellers of di¤erent qualities into di¤erent time periods: Low quality goods are
traded earlier at lower prices while high quality sellers have to wait until the average
quality of the remaining sellers is su¢ciently high for trade to take place. Hendel and
Lizzeri (1999) and Hendel et al. (2005), in turn, show that the lemons problem may
not arise at all if also the ownership structure is thought endegenous. The idea is
that if the quality of the good depreciates over time, the vintage of the good is then a
noisy signal of the quality. Market failure can be avoided if high valuation consumers
buy new goods and sell relatively ?quickly? while low valuation consumers self-select
to vintage markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 characterizes the basic
setup of the model. The existence of the pooling steady states is analyzed in Section
3. Section 4 provides a brief discussion on the properties of the pooling cycles. Section
5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
There are equal numbers of buyers and sellers who come to the market every period.
Without loss of generality, we assume that their numbers are normalized to unity.
Proportion q of the sellers produce a high quality good with production cost cH . The
rest of the sellers produce a low quality good with production cost cL. From the
high quality goods the buyers get utility uH , and from the low quality goods they get
utility uL. All buyers are identical, and they observe the quality of the good only after
they have purchased it. Contracts conditional on the quality of the good are assumed
infeasible.
We assume the following ranking of the magnitudes:
uH > cH > uL > cL:
Without loss of generality, we normalize cL = 0.
In a competitive and static setting, this assumption generates market failure
whenever u^ = quH + (1¡ q)uL < cH , or
q <
cH ¡ uL
uH ¡ uL ´ q^:
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If this is the case, the high quality sellers are reluctant to trade as the most a buyer
is willing to pay is u^ which is less than the high quality production cost. We make no
restrictions on the quality distribution but investigate the functioning of the dynamic
search market for all possible values of q; i.e. q 2 [0; 1].
Trading in the market is uncoordinated and decentralized. Matching between
buyers and sellers is modeled as an ?urn-ball? process à la Butters (1977) and Hall
(1979). Buyers (?balls?) are assumed to contact the sellers (?urns?). The number of
unmatched buyers in the market is M and the number of unmatched sellers is N .
We assume large markets with M ! 1; N ! 1, so that the number of buyers a
seller expects to meet is given by a Poisson distribution with parameter M=N ´ µ.
The probability that k buyers contact a particular seller is µ
k
k!
e¡µ. We assume that
the buyers contact sellers in an uncoordinated manner, and to that end we focus on
a symmetric strategy. This means that the buyers mix over which sellers to contact.
This results in a coordination failure in the market as some ?urns? (sellers) do not
receive any ?balls? (buyers) and thereby remain unmatched. Some ?urns?, however,
receive many ?balls?. But since exactly one ?urn? and one ?ball? establish a match, in a
congestion situation some of the ?balls? have to remain unmatched. This coordination
failure induces non-trivial frictions in the market because it extends the time span an
agent remains unmatched, and the agents discount future returns with the common
discount factor ±.
In the next section we consider the feasibility of pooling steady state equilibrium.
We start with a steady state with symmetric trading pattern, which means that all
seller types trade with equal probabilities. When such a steady state is infeasible,
we show that another pooling steady state may arise where trading is asymmetric in
the sense that high quality sellers conduct trades less frequently than the low quality
sellers.
3 Steady state equilibria
3.1 Pooling equilibrium
In a pooling steady state equilibrium there is no di¤erence between the probability
of trading high and low quality goods; trade takes place whenever at least one buyer
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candidate contacts a seller. Obviously, under symmetric trading, the steady state
fractions of high and low quality goods must equal the proportions of high quality
sellers among the incoming sellers, so that the expected quality of a traded good in a
steady state is u^ ´ quH + (1¡ q)uL.
The life time utility of buyers is denoted by B and the corresponding utilities of
high and low quality sellers by SH and SL. Buyers can observe how many other buyers
are competing for the same good. With probability e¡µ, only one buyer approaches
the seller and the buyer o¤ers pm. Since we are looking for a steady state equilibrium
where all qualities are traded, the price pm must cover the cost cH plus the loss of
the value of remaining unmatched in the market; i.e. pm = cH + SH . The earnings
of the high and low quality sellers are pm ¡ cH = SH and pm ¡ cL = cH + SH . With
probability 1¡ e¡µ, there are at least two bidders competing for the same good. The
buyers raise their bids upto pc where they are driven to their reservation utility levels;
i.e., pc solves u^ ¡ pc = B.
Evaluated at the end of a period the life-time utilities are determined by the
following equations:
B = ±fe¡µ(u^ ¡ cH ¡ SH) +
¡
1¡ e¡µ¢Bg;
SL = ±fe¡µSL + µe¡µ (cH + SH) +
¡
1¡ (1 + µ)e¡µ¢ (u^ ¡ B)g;
SH = ±fe¡µSH + µe¡µSH +
¡
1¡ (1 + µ)e¡µ¢ (u^ ¡ cH ¡ B)g:
In a steady state, those who trade are replaced by an equal number of new agents.
Since a unit measure of new buyers and sellers enter each period and since exactly one
buyer and one seller are required for a complete transaction, there is a steady state
with M = N or µ = 1. Given such a steady state con?guration, the system can be
solved for B, SL and SH to obtain
B =
±
e ¡ ± (u^ ¡ cH); (1)
SL =
± (e ¡ 2)
e ¡ ± (u^+
cH
e ¡ 2); (2)
SH =
± (e ¡ 2)
e ¡ ± (u^ ¡ cH): (3)
The viability of the pooling steady state equilibrium requires that each agent
earns non-negative life-time utility and no buyer can pro?t by o¤ering a di¤erent
price. Obviously, SL > 0 holds and requirements SH ; B ¸ 0 are satis?ed whenever
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u^ ¸ cH which corresponds to the condition in Akerlof?s benchmark. The relevant
deviation for the buyer is the following: When the buyer is alone with the seller, he
bids pmd = SL < cH+SH so that the transaction is concluded only if the good is of low
quality. When there is at least one other buyer candidate, the buyer is anyhow driven
to his reservation utility level4. The life-time utility available from the deviation is
given by
Bd = ±
©
e¡1 (qBd + (1¡ q) (uL ¡ SL)) +
¡
1¡ e¡1¢Bdª :
Solving for Bd gives
Bd =
± (1¡ q)
e (1¡ ±) + ± (1¡ q) (uL ¡ SL) : (4)
No buyer will deviate from the equilibrium trading practice if B ¸ Bd.
Proposition 1 The pooling equilibrium is feasible when the proportion of high quality
sellers satis?es
q ¸ maxfq^; qpg;
where qp solves
qp = q^ +
(1¡ qp)((e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)cH)
e ¡ ± ¡ ±qp(e ¡ 1) :
The threshold qp is greater than the Akerlo?an benchmark q^ if
± <
euL
(e ¡ 1) cH + uL ´
¹±1 < 1:
Proof. For proof, see Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 implies that the pooling equilibrium is viable within a narrower
range of quality distributions than in the Akerlo?an benchmark when ± · ¹±1. For
± 2 [¹±1; 1], the outcomes coincide. Lower ± magni?es the hindrance of the search
frictions and increases the attractiveness of the deviating strategy for buyers; i.e.
to restrict trades only with low quality sellers. Greater ?impatience? thus creates a
negative externality on the high quality sellers? trading opportunities and extends the
range of parameter values within which the lemons principle is in e¤ect. In fact,
Remark 1 The threshold qp is monotonously decreasing in ±; i.e.
@qp
@±
< 0.
4 It can be shown that it does not matter whether the buyer bids pc and earns B or does not
place a bid at all and earns Bd. The former option corresponds to the idea of ?one-time deviation?,
which is usually regarded as a su¢cient test for the viability of an equilibrium.
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1 ?
q
1
Pooling equilibrium
?1
(q+uL)/(1+uL)
q
qp
Figure 1: Feasibility of the pooling equilibrium.
Proof. For proof, see Appendix A.2.
Remark 1 thus implies that the ?lemons e¤ect? is the strongest in the static limit
of the model; i.e. when traders do not value future trading opportunities at all and
have ± = 0. In that extreme case, qp = (q^+ uL)=(1 + uL) > q^. Figure 1 illustrates the
viability of the pooling steady state in ±q-plane.
3.2 Partially pooling equilibrium
We now address the question what happens if the quality distribution does not satisfy
the condition in Proposition 1. We verify the possibility of another steady state where
the low quality goods are traded whenever at least one buyer approaches a seller,
while the high quality goods are traded only if there are multiple buyer candidates
competing for the same good. We call this mode of equilibrium trades as partially
pooling.
When there is only one buyer and one seller upon a meeting, the buyer rationally
expects that trade will take place only if his trading partner is a low quality seller and
the buyer makes a price o¤er accordingly; i.e. pm = SL. When there are two or more
buyers at the same meeting, the buyers know that all sellers trade and the winning bid
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is the one that drives the buyer to his reservation utility level, which is B. Evaluated
again at the end of a period the life-time utilities read as follows:
SL = ±
n
e¡µSL + µe¡µSL +
¡
1¡ (1 + µ)e¡µ¢ (U^ ¡ B)o ;
SH = ±
n
e¡µSH + µe¡µSH +
¡
1¡ (1 + µ)e¡µ¢ (U^ ¡ cH ¡ B)o ;
B = ±
©
e¡µ (QB + (1¡ Q) (uL ¡ SL)) +
¡
1¡ e¡µ¢Bª :
Note that since the high quality sellers conduct trades less frequently than the
low quality sellers, their steady state fraction Q must be greater than q, so that
U^ = QuH + (1¡ Q)uL > u^. However, even though the composition of sellers is now
di¤erent from the case examined above, the corresponding steady state still features
M = N , or µ = 1. The steady state share of high quality sellers Q in relation to q
then yields:
Lemma 1 The partially pooling steady state implies
Q =
q (e ¡ 1)
q + e ¡ 2 > q:
Proof. Denote the measure of high (low) quality sellers in the market by NH = QN
(NL = (1¡ Q)N). Steady state implies that¡
1¡ 2e¡1¢NH = q; (5)¡
1¡ e¡1¢NL = 1¡ q; (6)
The result follows directly from (5)-(6) and the fact that Q = NH
NH+NL
.
The value equations thus simplify to
SL =
± (e ¡ 2)
e ¡ 2± (U^ ¡ B), (7)
SH =
± (e ¡ 2)
e ¡ 2± (U^ ¡ cH ¡ B); (8)
B =
± (1¡ Q)
(1¡ ±) e+ ± (1¡ Q) (uL ¡ SL) : (9)
The viability of the partially pooling equilibrium requires that the life-time utilities are
non-negative. Since SL > SH , the relevant conditions to be worked through are SH ¸ 0
and B ¸ 0. Moreover, one also has to check that buyers do not have an incentive to
deviate from the asymmetric trading pattern. Since Q is such that U^ ¸ cH , a solitary
9
buyer could feasibly propose an o¤er that would also be accepted by a high quality
seller. The buyer?s utility from such a deviation yields
Bd =
±
e
f(U^ ¡ cH ¡ SH) + (e ¡ 1)Bdg: (10)
No buyer will ever deviate from the equilibrium trading practice if Bd · B.
Proposition 2 The partially pooling equilibrium is feasible when the proportion of
high quality sellers satis?es
Qpp · Q · Qpp;
where Qpp and Q
pp
solve
Qpp = q^ +
±(1¡ Qpp)((e ¡ 2±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 2)cH)
2±2(e ¡ 1 +Qpp) + e(e ¡ ±(1 +Qpp + e)) ; and
Q
pp
= q^ +
(e ¡ ±)(1¡ Qpp)((e ¡ 2±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 2)cH)
(e ¡ 2±)(e ¡ ± ¡ ±Qpp(e ¡ 1)) :
The interval [Qpp; Q
pp
] with the property q^ · Qpp · Qpp exists if
± · euL
(e ¡ 2) cH + 2uL ´
¹±2:
For the threshold ¹±2 it holds that ¹±1 < ¹±2 < 1.
Proof. For proof, see Appendix A.3.
Again, the proportion of high quality sellers has to be large enough, i.e. Q ¸ Qpp,
in order for the high quality price to be su¢ciently high, not only to cover the cost cH
but also the buyers? reservation value B. On the other hand, this proportion should
not be too large either, i.e. Q · Qpp, because otherwise the buyer, when being the
only purchacer candidate, would become tempted to o¤er a price that would attract
also the high quality sellers to conduct trade. As a result, the partially pooling mode
could no longer hold as an equilibrium trading practice.
Remark 2 For 8± · ¹±2 it holds that
Q
pp ¸ qp:
I.e. there exist proportions of high quality goods such that both the pooling and the
partially pooling equilibrium are simultaneously consitent with these steady state quality
distributions.
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1 ?
Q
1
Pooling equilibrium
?1
(q+uL)/(1+uL)
q
qp
Qpp
Qpp
Partially pooling
equilibrium
?2
Figure 2: The overlap of pooling and partially pooling outcomes in Q±-plane.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Hence, regarding the proportion of high quality sellers among all sellers in the
market, the two alternative regimes, the pooling equilibrium and the partially pooling
equilibrium, can be supported by the same overall quality distributions (see Figure
2). The reason why these alternative outcomes are not mutually exclusive stems
from the di¤erence in buyers? coordination in the trading practice. In the partially
pooling equilibrium, buyers choose to conduct high quality trades only in competitive
situations and they gain by doing so. Therefore it may not pay to deviate from the
partially pooling regime, even though also the completely pooling outcome would be
feasible.
Although the feasibility of the partially pooling equilibrium requires that the
steady state proportion of high quality sellers is greater than the Akerlo?an benchmark
q^, we know by Lemma 1 that this does not have to hold for the incoming sellers. In
order to get an idea to what extent the partially pooling trading practice may help
overcome the lemons problem, we next consider how the proportions of high quality
agents among the incoming sellers that support the partially pooling steady state
compare to q^.
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Proposition 3 Regarding the proportion of high quality sellers among the new en-
trants, the partially pooling equilibrium is feasible for q 2 £qpp; qpp¤ where qpp and qpp
are given by
qpp =
(e ¡ 2)Qpp
e ¡ 1¡ Qpp and q
pp =
(e ¡ 2)Qpp
e ¡ 1¡ Qpp :
It holds that
(i) if q^ ¸ (e ¡ 2)uL, then qpp · qpp · q^ 8± 2
£
0; ¹±2
¤
,
(ii) if q^ < (e ¡ 2)uL, then 9~± s.t. qpp · qpp · q^ 8± 2
h
~±; ¹±2
i
. Moreover,
9± 2
h
0; ~±
i
s.t. qpp · q^ · qpp.
Proof. For proof, see Appendix A.5.
The main insight in the Proposition 3 is that the partially pooling equilibrium
extends to a range of quality distributions which in the Akerlo?an benchmark would
drive the high quality sellers out of the market. In fact, if uL is low enough so that
q^ ¸ (e ¡ 2)uL, even the upper bound for the proportion of high quality goods qpp
is always lower than the threshold q^. In this case, the partially pooling equilibrium
can be supported only by quality distributions which in the competitive and static
model would lead to a market for ?lemons? only. Figure 3 illustrates the possible
divisions of di¤erent pooling regimes in ±q-plane. Note that the possible overlap of
the pooling and the partially pooling regions in ±q-plane is analytically di¢cult to
rule out. However, our numerical simulations through the relevant parameter values
con?rm that an overlapping region does not exist.5
Hence, there is a region in between the two pooling steady states where the
proportion of high quality goods among the newly entered sellers is too low to support
the symmetric trading pattern but too high for the asymmetric trading practice (i.e.
partially pooling) to be feasible. Symmetric trading is not feasible because buyers?
ability to conduct gainful trade with low quality sellers makes them reluctant to o¤er a
price high enough for high quality sellers to be willing to trade. On the other hand, the
asymmetric trading pattern is sustainable neither because the buyer, when being the
sole purchaser candidate, ?nds it bene?cial to deviate and o¤er a price that induces
also the high quality sellers to trade. As a result, the out?ow of high quality goods
overruns their in?ow and the steady state cannot be sustained. In the region below the
asymmetric pooling steady state, in turn, the relative number of good sellers among
5 The calibration details are available form the authors upon request.
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1 ?
q
1
Pooling equilibrium
?1
(q+uL)/(1+uL)
q
qp
qpp
qppPartially pooling
equilibrium
?2 1
?
q
1
Pooling equilibrium
?1
q
?2
Partially pooling
equilibrium
qpp
qpp
q <(e-2)uL q =(e-2)uL
qp
Figure 3: The division of the steady state pooling equilibria.
the new entrants is too low to maintain the steady state where high quality sellers exit
at a frequency required by the asymmetric trading pattern.
Interestingly, the partially pooling equilibrium ceases to exist when the discount
factor is high enough, i.e. ± > ¹±2. As the agents become more patient, the opportunity
cost of sales increases and the low quality sellers can seize ever increasing fraction of
the rent when in contact with a single buyer candidate. This attracts buyers to deviate
and o¤er a price that will be accepted also by the high quality sellers. The fact that
an increase in the value of the future trading opportunities limits the feasibility of the
partially pooling equilibrium runs counter to the previously held view that a dynamic
trading perspective is a necessary precondition for a successful resolution of the lemons
problem.
4 Pooling cycles
The blank areas in Figure 3 represent the combination of the discount factor and
the average quality of the incoming sellers that support neither of the pooling steady
states. These areas must feature non-steady state equilibria, if any, and it turns out
that there exist cyclical equilibria: There are periods when only low quality goods are
traded and the proportion of high quality good traders accumulates until it exceeds
a treshold beyond which also high quality goods can be gainfully traded. In the
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equilibrium that we construct this only happens when a high quality seller meets
more than one buyer, and thus there is partial pooling like in Section 3. When high
quality goods are traded the share of high quality sellers starts declining, and once it
drops below the treshold there is trade in low quality goods only. The length of partial
pooling in the cycle is but one period; whenever high quality goods are traded the
share of high quality sellers immediately drops below the treshold, and the ?lemons
principle? kicks in. The number of periods when only low quality goods are traded
varies. In terms of the high quality sellers? trading opportunities, we observe
Proposition 4 When neither of the steady states is feasible, high quality goods can
be traded only in non-consecutive trading periods.
Proof. For proof, see Appendix A.6.
Dynamic markets with adverse selection problems feature trading cycles also in
Janssen and Roy (2004). Their focus is, however, on Walrasian prices while in our
model prices are determined in many local situations in a non-cooperative way. The
results of the two models are very close. Janssen and Roy show that the high quality
sellers have to wait longer than low quality sellers until they trade. In our model, the
same holds as the low quality sellers trade every time they meet a seller while the high
quality sellers may trade only in some periods, and even then they trade only if they
meet several buyers.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the adverse selection problem in an ?urn-ball? random matching
model with auctions as the price formation method. We ?rst show that the standard
pooling equilibrium with equally frequent sales of all qualities is feasible for a narrower
range of quality distributions than in Akerlof?s competitive and static benchmark.
This is because buyers? ability to earn positive rents when trading with low quality
sellers creates a negative externality on high quality sellers? trading opportunities.
When the pooling steady state with the symmetric trading pattern is not feasible, the
high quality sellers can still expect to trade, albeit less frequently than the low quality
sellers. There exists another steady state featuring partially pooling in a sense high
quality sales occur whenever two or more buyer candidates compete for the good. This
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asymmetric trading pattern is supported as a steady state practice even for some qual-
ity distribution that in the Akerlo?an world would give rise to the ?lemons principle?.
Quite interestingly, however, the partially pooling equilibrium ceases to exist as the
agents become patient enough, i.e. the discount factor is su¢ciently high. This ?nding
is inconsistent with some earlier results suggesting that a dynamic trading perspective
is a necessary precondition for a successful resolution of the lemons problem. For the
remaining quality distributions which support neither of the proposed steady states,
the model exhibits pooling cycles. The cycles are such that high quality goods are
sold only in non-consecutive periods. In this respect, dynamic horizon guarantees at
least temporary trading opportunities for the high quality sellers.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Conditions SH ¸ 0 and B ¸ 0 are satis?ed whenever u^ ¸ cH , or q ¸ cH¡uLuH¡uL ´ q^.
Using (1) and (4), the non-deviation condition B ¸ Bd can be shown to hold if
u^ ¸ (1¡ q) (e ¡ ±) uL + e (1¡ ±) cH
e ¡ ± ¡ ±q (e ¡ 1) ´ u^
nd: (11)
We start the proof by showing that qp ¸ q^ for ± · ¹±1. This is done by examining when
B ¸ Bd is a stricter condition than SH ¸ 0 and B ¸ 0; i.e. when u^nd ¸ cH . This is
the case if (e ¡ ±)uL ¸ ± (e ¡ 1) cH , or
± · euL
(e ¡ 1) cH + uL ´
¹±1.
Remembering that u^ = quH + (1¡ q)uL and using the de?nition of q^, the in-
equality in (11) can be written in terms of q as
q ¸ q^ + (1¡ q)((e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)cH)
e ¡ ± ¡ ±q(e ¡ 1) ;
so that the threshold qp solves this condition with equality.
In order to prove the existence of a unique solution for qp, let us rewrite (11) as
the following inequality:
¡±(e ¡ 1)(uH ¡ uL)q2 + [(e ¡ ±)uH ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)uL]q ¡ e(1¡ ±)cH ¸ 0: (12)
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It should be obvious that (12) holds whenever q 2 (q1; q2); where q1 are q2 the roots
that make (12) hold with equality. Now, for q = 1 (12) obtains
uH ¸ cH ;
which holds with strict inequality by assumption. Then it must hold that the roots
q1 and q2 are real and satisfy q1 < 1 < q2. Thus, since q only takes values between 0
and 1, qp = q1is unique solution for (12) holding with equality.
The pooling equilibrium thus exists for q 2 [max fq^; qpg ; 1].
A.2 Proof of Remark 1
To establish the claim, write the solution formula for qp as
qp =
(e¡±)
±
uH ¡ (e ¡ 1)uL ¡
q
[ (e¡±)
±
uH ¡ (e ¡ 1)uL]2 ¡ 4(e ¡ 1)(uH ¡ uL)e (1¡±)± cH
2(e ¡ 1)(uH ¡ uL) ;
so that ± appears only in the numerator. Aggregating the relevant terms obtains
qp =
a (±)¡ ([a (±)]2 ¡ b (±)) 12
2(e ¡ 1)(uH ¡ uL) ;
where a (±) = (e¡±)
±
uH ¡ (e ¡ 1)uL and b (±) = 4(e ¡ 1)(uH ¡ uL)e (1¡±)± cH . Then
sign (@qp=@±) = sign
Ã
a0 (±) ¡ 2a (±) a
0 (±)¡ b0 (±)
2([a (±)]2 ¡ b (±)) 12
!
= sign
Ã
a0 (±) (1¡ a (±)
([a (±)]2 ¡ b (±)) 12 ) +
b0 (±)
([a (±)]2 ¡ b (±)) 12
!
< 0;
because a0 (±) < 0; b0 (±) < 0 and a (±) =
h
([a (±)]2 ¡ b (±)) 12
i
< 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (7) in (9), the explicit solution for B yields
B =
± (1¡ Q)
(1¡ ±) e(e ¡ ± (1 +Q))((e ¡ 2±) uL ¡ ± (e ¡ 2) U^); (13)
which implies that B ¸ 0 if
U^ · e ¡ 2±
± (e ¡ 2)uL ´ U^B¸0: (14)
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Then (8) and (13) together imply that SH ¸ 0 if
U^ ¸ ± (1¡ Q) (e ¡ 2±)uL + e (1¡ ±) (e ¡ ± (1 +Q)) cH
2±2 (e ¡ (1¡ Q)) + e (e ¡ ±(1 +Q+ e)) ´ U^SH¸0: (15)
Equations (8), (10) and (13), in turn, imply that the buyers? non-deviation condition,
Bd · B, holds if
U^ · (1¡ Q) (e ¡ 2±) (e ¡ ±) uL + e (1¡ ±) (e ¡ ± (1 +Q)) cH
(e ¡ 2±) (e ¡ ± ¡ ±Q (e ¡ 1)) ´ U^Bd·B (16)
Since U^B¸0 ¸ U^Bd·B if
uL ¸ ± (e ¡ 2)
e ¡ 2± cH ; or
± · euL
(e ¡ 2) cH + 2uL ´
¹±2;
(16) is stricter than (14) for ± · ¹±2. On the other hand, (15) and (16) imply that
it also holds that U^Bd·B ¸ U^SH¸0 if ± · ¹±2. From this it follows that the partially
pooling equilibrium can only be feasible for ± · ¹±2. Hence, the relevant conditions
restricting the existence of the proposed steady state are SH ¸ 0 and Bd · B: Again
using the fact that U^ = QuH + (1¡ Q)uL, the expressions for the thresholds Qpp and
Q
pp
are derived by rewriting (15) and (13) in terms of Q and setting the conditions
to hold with equality. It is quite easy to check that q^ · Qpp · Qpp holds whenever
± · ¹±2.
The existence and uniqueness of the thresholds Qpp and Q
pp
can be proved by
following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.1. First, (15)
can be rewritten as
¡± (e ¡ 2±) (uH ¡ uL)Q2 +
+
£¡
2±2 (e ¡ 1) + e (e ¡ ±(1 + e))¢ (uH ¡ uL) + e (1¡ ±) ±cH¤Q
+e (1¡ ±) [(e ¡ ±) cH ¡ (e ¡ 2±)uL] (17)
¸ 0:
It is again obvious that (17) holds whenever Q 2 (Q1;Q2); where Q1 are Q2 the roots
that make (17) hold with equality. For Q = 1, (17) obtains uH ¸ cH which holds with
strict inequality by assumption. Then it must hold that the roots Q1 and Q2 are real
and satisfy Q1 < 1 < Q2. Thus, since Q only takes values between 0 and 1, Qpp = q1
17
is unique solution for (17) holding with equality. Similarly, (16) can be rewritten as
¡± (e ¡ 2±) (e ¡ 1) (uH ¡ uL)Q2 +
+ [(e ¡ 2±) (e ¡ ±) (uH ¡ uL) + e (1¡ ±) ((e ¡ 2±)uL + ±cH)]Q
¡e (1¡ ±) (e ¡ ±) cH · 0: (18)
Since (18) obviously holds for Q = 0 and since for Q = 1 it obtains uH · cH which is
inconsistent with the model assumptions, it must hold that there is a unique Q
pp
s.t.
(18) holds with equality.
A.4 Proof of Remark 2
The condition determining Q
pp
in Proposition 2 can be rewritten as
Q
pp ¡ (1¡ Q
pp
)((e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e¡2)(e¡±)e¡2± cH)
e ¡ ± ¡ ±Qpp(e ¡ 1) = q^;
while the condition for qp obtains
qp ¡ (1¡ q
p)((e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)cH)
e ¡ ± ¡ ±qp(e ¡ 1) = q^:
De?ne
A1 ´ (e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 2)(e ¡ ±)
e ¡ 2± cH ; and
A2 ´ (e ¡ ±)uL ¡ ±(e ¡ 1)cH ;
so that
Q
pp ¡ 1¡ Q
pp
e ¡ ± ¡ ±Qpp(e ¡ 1)A1 = q^ and q
p ¡ 1¡ q
p
e ¡ ± ¡ ±qp(e ¡ 1)A2 = q^:
Obviously, A1 > A2 because
(e¡2)(e¡±)
e¡2± < e ¡ 1. Consider now the following equation:
Q ¡ 1¡ Q
e ¡ ± ¡ ±Q(e ¡ 1)A = q^:
Totally di¤erentiating this with respect to Q and A gives
dQ
dA
=
1¡Q
e¡±¡±Q(e¡1)
1 +A (1¡±)e
(e¡±¡±Q(e¡1))2
> 0;
from which it follows that Q
pp
> qp since A1 > A2.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We start the proof by noting that @Q
pp
=@± < 0 (this can be shown by following exactly
the same steps as above in the proof of Remark 1 in Appendix A.2), from which it
follows that also @qpp=@± < 0. Then note that for ± = 0 Q
pp
= (q^ + uL)=(1 + uL),
which by Lemma 1 implies that for ± = 0
qpp =
(e ¡ 2) (q^ + uL)
e ¡ 1 + (e ¡ 2)uL ¡ q^ :
From this it follows that qpp±=0 · q^ if q^ ¸ (e ¡ 2)uL. Therefore, since @qpp=@± < 0;
we know that if q^ ¸ (e ¡ 2)uL, then qpp · qpp · q^ 8± 2
£
0; ¹±2
¤
, which was our claim
in part (i).
To establish the claim in the second part with the case q^ < (e ¡ 2)uL, note ?rst
that if ± ! ¹±2 then Qpp ! q^. Thus, it must hold that qpp · qpp · q^ for ± su¢ciently
?close? to ¹±2; i.e. 9~± s.t. qpp · q^ · qpp 8± 2
h
~±; ¹±2
i
. On the other hand, if ± ! 0 then
Qpp ! q^ and it must hold that 9± 2
h
0; ~±
i
s.t. qpp · q^ · qpp.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Let q be the minimum proportion of high quality sellers such that a buyer is willing to
o¤er a price that makes the high quality seller willing to trade. Notice that this only
happens when a seller meets more than one buyer. We determine the steady state
values of good and bad sellers when the proportion of the former is exactly q. The
steady state stock of bad sellers is (1¡q)e
e¡1 , and let the stock of good sellers be X . Now,
X is determined by
X
X + (1¡q)e
e¡1
= q:
Each period measure q of high quality sellers enter the market. The maximum stock of
good sellers that can exist in the market is X+ q. When this happens the good sellers
start making trades, and we want to show that the number of entering good sellers
who exit, (X + q) (1¡ 2e¡1), is greater than the number of entering good sellers q.
The inequality
(X + q)
¡
1¡ 2e¡1¢ > q
becomes, when inserting the formula of X,
1¡ q
1¡ q
e
e ¡ 1 >
q
q
2
e ¡ 2 :
19
The inequality is hardest to satisfy when q is the largest. Inserting the formula of the
greatest possible value of q, namely q =
(e¡2)q
e¡1¡q , here the inequality becomes e > 2,
which always holds.
This means that whenever the proportion of high quality sellers goes over the
threshold q, the good sellers trade only for that period as then the proportion drops
below q right next period. Then the proportion of good sellers increases over time
until it goes over the threshold again.
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